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Contemporary Issues in Historical Perspective
A Looming Crash or a Soft Landing? Forecasting the
Future of the Memory “Industry”*
Gavriel D. Rosenfeld
Fairfield University

Back in the late 1990s, as I was just entering the job market as a newly minted
PhD, I arranged a lunch meeting with the editor of a major university press to
pitch my first book manuscript on architecture and the memory of Nazism in
postwar Munich. After listening to me for several minutes, the editor, fidgeting somewhat, flatly asked, “Don’t you think the current infatuation with
memory has already played itself out?” Taken aback, I replied that I thought
the subject was only beginning to come into its own and had years of growth
ahead of it. The editor, I must confess, did not look very convinced by my
answer. He proceeded to shift our conversation onto a different track, and
before long our exchange about the future of memory studies had come to a
close. For my part, I continued to pursue my interest in the subject without a
second thought. Not too long after our meeting, I published my first book on
memory and have since published a second.1 By all indications, the editor’s
skepticism about the prospects of memory studies failed to influence the
subsequent course of my scholarly career.
Of late, however, I have begun to think back on my conversation with the
editor and revisit his skeptical thoughts about the future of memory studies. I
have done so not because I have developed a sneaking suspicion that he was
right—it is much too late for him to be vindicated— but rather because I have
begun to wonder how much longer memory studies will be able to maintain
its position as one of the more influential fields of interdisciplinary scholarship
in contemporary academia. As is well known, the topic of memory has risen
to an extremely prominent position within the humanities and social sciences
over the course of the last two decades. So influential has the study of memory
* I would like to thank Saul Friedländer, Peter Baldwin, David Myers, Eugene
Sheppard, Josh Goode, and Alvin H. Rosenfeld for reading early drafts of this article.
I am also grateful to the Journal of Modern History’s anonymous readers for their
editorial suggestions.
1
Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments, and the
Legacy of the Third Reich (Berkeley, 2000), and The World Hitler Never Made:
Alternate History and the Memory of Nazism (Cambridge, 2005).
The Journal of Modern History 81 (March 2009): 122–158
© 2009 by The University of Chicago. 0022-2801/2009/8101-0004$10.00
All rights reserved.
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become that scholars now routinely refer to the emergence of a “memory
boom” and even to the rise of a “memory industry.”2 These phrases are
somewhat glib, of course. But they may end up being portentous. For as any
casual observer of economics knows, all booms are temporary. Following
periods of rapid growth, emerging industries inevitably crest. Some settle into
stable periods of prolonged, if modest, growth. And others crash.
This article seeks to determine which fate awaits the memory “industry.” In
thinking about this topic, I have become convinced that however much
memory studies has established itself as a thriving field in academia, its
current status eventually will be diminished by major changes afoot in the
world today. I have been tempted, therefore, to paraphrase Francis Fukuyama’s provocative thesis about the “end of history” and boldly prophesy the
“end of memory.”3 Yet, in light of Fukuyama’s failure to anticipate the
subsequent course of historical events—and in light of the overabundance of
books heralding “the end” of all kinds of other things—I have chosen to
refrain from such a reckless prediction.4 At the same time, however, I contend
that there are numerous signs that the recent memory boom may have peaked
and may soon be abating. As I hope to show, the factors that initially helped
elevate memory to unprecedented prominence have begun to fade in the last
several years and will likely continue to do so.5

2 See, e.g., Charles Maier, “A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy, and Denial,” History and Memory, Fall/Winter 1993, 143; Andreas Huyssen,
Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York, 1995), 8;
Kerwin Lee Klein, “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse,” Representations, Winter 2000, 127–50; Jay Winter, “The Generation of Memory: Reflections
on the ‘Memory Boom’ in Contemporary Historical Studies,” Bulletin of the German
Historical Institute 27, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 69 –92. See also Jay Winter, Remembering
War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New
Haven, CT, 2006). Elazar Barkan refers to an “industry of memory” in The Guilt of
Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (Baltimore, 2000), 24. See
also Emily Rosenberg, A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory
(Durham, NC, 2003), esp. chap. 6.
3
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, Summer 1989, 3–18.
4
See Walter Truett Anderson, “Let’s Put an End to ‘The End of’ Books,” Pacific
News Service, March 4, 1996, http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?
article_id⫽446f3e3382a85b949e4f574c3391a22f.
5
In making this assertion, I do not wish to be misunderstood as a proponent of this
development, let alone an enabler of it. Indeed, I hope to preempt any suspicion that
I am somehow aiming to undermine the study of memory by emphasizing that all of
my current research and much of my projected research remains focused on the subject
of memory in one way or another. See Gavriel D. Rosenfeld and Paul Jaskot, eds.,
Beyond Berlin: Twelve German Cities Confront the Nazi Past (Ann Arbor, MI, 2008).
I am also currently at work on a new project tentatively entitled Building after
Auschwitz: Jewish Architecture and Jewish Memory since the Holocaust.
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THE RISE

OF

MEMORY

Affirmations of the surging significance of memory have abounded in recent
years. While some trend spotters have matter-of-factly pointed to memory’s
emergence as a “cultural buzz word” and declared it to be “decidedly in
fashion,” others have more dramatically referred to the growing “obsession
with memory,” the eruption of a “memory craze,” the spread of a “memory
fever,” and even the outbreak of a “memory epidemic.”6 Such colorful
descriptions are evocative, but the most influential terms that have emerged
for conceptualizing the phenomenon have been the “memory boom” and the
“memory industry.” The use of these appellations dates back to the early
1990s, and in recent years they have caught on with a good number of
scholars.7 No matter how popular the “memory boom” and “memory industry” have become as terms of reference, however, their precise meaning has
been somewhat clouded by the fact that they have frequently been used
interchangeably to refer to two separate, albeit related, phenomena: first, the
worldwide proliferation during the last two decades of public controversies
over divisive historical legacies and, second, the emergence of scholarly
interest in studying memory as a broader social and cultural phenomenon.8
Anyone hoping to understand either of these trends, of course, must examine
them as distinct, if related, phenomena. And so for reasons of analytical
6 Jan-Werner Müller, “Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power,
and the Power over Memory,” in Memory and Power in Postwar Europe: Studies in
the Presence of the Past, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge, 2002), 18; Nancy Wood,
Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe (Oxford, 1999); Natalie
Zemon Davis and Randolph Starn, introduction to the special issue on memory in
Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 1; David Berliner, “The Abuses of Memory:
Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology,” Anthropological Quarterly 78,
no. 1 (2005): 203; Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the
Politics of Memory (Stanford, CA, 2003), 27.
7
The first use of the “memory industry” that I have been able to locate is Michael
Kammen’s 1991 reference to the “memory industry” surrounding the commemoration
of the Holocaust in Israel. Michael Kammen, The Mystic Chords of Memory: The
Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New York, 1991), 3.
8
Jay Winter, e.g., defines the memory “boom” as “the efflorescence of interest in the
subject of memory inside the academy and beyond” (in short, what others have termed
the academic memory “industry”): Winter, Remembering War, 1. Winter, moreover,
argues that the current memory boom was preceded by a prior memory boom from
1890 to 1920, which dealt with the invention of national identities and the commemoration of the fallen of World War I. I find Winter’s usage of the term “boom” for both
phenomena unnecessarily confusing and argue that the fin de siècle interest in remembrance is better described by a different phrase that he uses in his analysis, namely,
“cult of memory” (25–26). Overall, what makes the memory boom of the last two
decades unique is the traumatic nature and global scope of the historical legacies that
have been confronted during it.
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convenience, I will refer in this article to the eruption of a “boom” of public
controversies over memory, on the one hand, and the growth of a scholarly
“industry” devoted to studying them, on the other.9
Terminology aside, the emergence of memory represents one of the more
noteworthy developments of contemporary Western, if not global, cultural and
intellectual life. According to various observers who have studied the boom in
public debates over the past, memory has developed into what Andreas
Huyssen has called “a cultural obsession of [such] monumental proportions”
that it has become, in the words of Jay Winter, “the historical signature of our
own generation.”10 So frequently have public controversies erupted over
contested historical legacies worldwide that a shorthand designation for
them—“the politics of memory”— has entered popular parlance to describe
the phenomenon.11 In short, few would disagree with Susan Suleiman’s
contention that “the era we are living in is . . . the era of memory.”12 Echoing
these claims about the memory boom are equally dramatic claims about the
academic memory industry. For many scholars, memory has become the focus
of a massive paradigm shift within the humanities and social sciences.13
Historians have been particularly aware of this shift, with some describing
memory as “the leading term in our new cultural history,” others arguing that
memory has replaced “society” as the primary focus of contemporary histor9 I should stress that I do not use the term “industry” in the mildly pejorative sense
of some scholars whose use of it seems to imply that the field’s practitioners have
somehow lost sight of their original—purely intellectual— goals and instead have
begun opportunistically to pursue baser aims, whether status or profit. Rather, I use the
term “industry” more neutrally, as a term of reference for a successful and popular, if
also profitable, subset of the larger world of academic publishing. I also do not wish
to imply that the “industry” is narrowly devoted to studying only historical controversies; it has also focused on the larger dynamics of remembrance more broadly.
10
Huyssen, Twilight Memories, 26; Winter, “Generation of Memory,” 13.
11
For scholarly and journalistic uses of the phrase, see, among many others, Richard
Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu, eds., The Politics of Memory in
Postwar Europe (Durham, NC, 2006); Alexandra Barahona De Brito, Carman Gonzalez Enriquez, and Paloma Aguilar, eds., The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice
in Democratizing Societies (Oxford, 2001); Jane Kramer, The Politics of Memory:
Looking for Germany in the New Germany (New York, 1996); Raul Hilberg, The
Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian (New York, 2002); Joan B.
Wolf, Harnessing the Holocaust: The Politics of Memory in France (Stanford, CA,
2004); Amos Elon, “The Politics of Memory,” New York Review of Books, October 7,
1993.
12
Susan Suleiman, Crises of Memory and the Second World War (Cambridge, MA,
2006), 8.
13 Müller, “Introduction,” 13. See also Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in
Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” History and
Theory, May 2002, 180; Patrick Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, NH,
1993), 1.
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ical scholarship, and still others going so far as to say that “memory has
become the discourse that replaces history” itself.14
And yet, while there is no shortage of declarations about memory’s new
prominence, accounting for the origins of the memory boom and memory
industry is a more daunting task. Perhaps the most obvious challenge, as
Kerwin Klein has pointed out, is the fact that “memory . . . is applied to so
many phenomena that an inclusive history of its origins would . . . approach
the universal.”15 It is small wonder, therefore, that the call of historians to
write an overall history of memory has not yet been heeded.16 Nevertheless, an
increasing number of scholars have begun to pave the way for such a history
by offering explanations of the joint appearance of the memory boom and the
memory industry. These scholars’ explanations have differed in both their
depth and their overall orientation, but they reveal that a wide range of
political, social, cultural, and intellectual factors have been deeply involved in
producing the recent mania for memory. In examining these factors in the
pages that follow, I would like to emphasize that I do so in a somewhat
sweeping and schematic fashion and that I recognize that the surging interest
in memory is not reducible to them alone. Moreover, I do not claim to have
exhaustively described every way in which these particular factors have
contributed to memory’s new prominence. Still, even if done suggestively
rather than definitively, surveying how these factors have contributed to
memory’s rise should help us determine what their shifting status in the
turbulent world of today portends for memory’s future.

UNMASTERED PASTS
One of the most important preconditions for the recent memory boom has
been the presence of numerous “unmastered” pasts throughout the West and
other parts of the world. The concept of an “unmastered” past resists easy
definition, but it essentially refers to a historical legacy that has acquired an
14
Klein, “On the Emergence,” 128; Alon Confino, “Introduction,” History and
Memory 17, nos. 1–2 (2005): 7; Maier, “Surfeit of Memory?” 142.
15
Klein, “On the Emergence,” 144.
16
Scholars have been calling for a “history of memory” for over a decade now. See
Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 1; Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and
Cultural History: Problems of Method,” American Historical Review, December 1997,
1403; Peter Fritzsche, “The Case of Modern Memory,” Journal of Modern History 73
(March 2001): 115. Valuable efforts to historicize memory include Richard Terdiman,
Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis (Ithaca, NY, 1993); David Gross, Lost
Time: On Remembering and Forgetting in Late Modern Culture (Amherst, MA, 2000);
Harald Weinrich, Lethe: The Art and Critique of Forgetting (Ithaca, NY, 2004); Peter
Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History
(Cambridge, MA, 2004).
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exceptional, abnormal, or otherwise unsettled status in the collective memory
of a given society.17 This distinct status arises from the fact that the particular
past in question typically involves the commission of a historic injustice—an
act of war, genocide, or political oppression—that has been remembered
differently by, and has caused discord between, the original perpetrators,
victims, and their respective descendants. Because perpetrators are usually
reluctant to accept responsibility for the past and prefer to forget it and
because victims insist on bearing witness to their suffering and pursuing
redress for it, legacies of historic injustice invariably become divisive and
contested. Such discord over recent historical events can take time to emerge,
of course. In the immediate aftermath of such events, both the perpetrators and
the victims may tend to avoid discussing the past and prefer to displace it from
the public to the private sphere. The result is the emergence of what some
scholars have referred to as a “great silence” toward— or what others have
imperfectly called the general “repression” of—the past.18 To be sure, in most
societies during this early phase, difficult historical legacies tend not to be
avoided in their entirety. Rather than being altogether quarantined, the past
may be addressed periodically in public fashion. When it is, however, its
“unmastered” character is visible in the apologetic strategies that are used to
17 The concept of an unmastered past has been discussed most thoroughly in the vast
literature on the German struggle to deal with the legacy of the Third Reich—a struggle
that is frequently described by the German term Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or “mastering the past.” For one of many examples, see Charles Maier, The Unmasterable
Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, MA, 1988). As
for the controversial concept of “collective memory,” I prefer not to get bogged down
in a complicated discussion about terminology and will simply assert that I use the
term loosely to encompass both “communicative” and “cultural” memories (i.e., both
personally experienced and culturally mediated memories). Jan Assmann, “Kollektives
Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität,” in Kultur und Gedächtnis, ed. Jan Assmann and
Tonio Holscher (Frankfurt am Main, 1988). An unmastered past, of course, need not
only refer to an unsettled legacy within a single society but can refer to a legacy that
sparks disagreement among different societies as well.
18
Numerous scholars have used the term “silence” to describe the evasion of the
past in various nations. Tom Segev uses the phrase “great silence” to describe the early
postwar Israeli response to the Holocaust (The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the
Holocaust [New York, 1993], 10). Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider use the term to
describe the early postwar decades in Germany, the United States, and Israel in their
study The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Philadelphia, 2006), 16 –17. See
also Yasuko I. Takezawa, ed., Breaking the Silence: Redress and Japanese American
Ethnicity (Ithaca, NY, 1995). The Freudian concept of “repression” has frequently
been used by historians to refer to the evasion of the past. See, e.g., Henry Rousso’s
The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 (Cambridge, 1991),
which uses the term “repressions” to refer to the early postwar French response to
collaboration (60 –98). The concept of repression remains controversial among scholars. See Daniel Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past
(New York, 1996), 234 –35.
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frame it, as well as in the taboos that come to surround it. Overall, until
perpetrators, victims, and their descendants can reconcile with one another
and arrive at some form of consensus about the meaning of a given historical
legacy (something that is usually facilitated by the offering and acceptance of
various legal, economic, symbolic, and commemorative gestures of atonement), the past can safely be described as “unmastered.”19
In Europe, the concept of an unmastered past has frequently been associated
with (though not limited to) the traumas of the Second World War. The
unprecedented crimes perpetrated by Nazi Germany against Jews and other
civilians during the war years, the collaboration of countless Europeans in
those crimes, and the persecution of those who resisted; the numerous episodes of ethnic cleansing and population transfer that took place during and
immediately after the war; and the unprecedented brutality of wartime combat
itself, epitomized by the unprecedented destruction of European cities in aerial
bombing raids—all of these things were directly experienced or witnessed by
millions of Europeans during the war years. After 1945, the memories of these
experiences were so emotionally painful at the personal level that most
Europeans simply preferred to avoid recalling the past altogether. Yet, it was
not merely individual psychology but also tangible economic and political
factors that were involved in the early postwar marginalization of memory.
The magnitude of economic reconstruction reinforced the need for present
mindedness, while the thorny task of restoring domestic political stability—
achieved most often by reintegrating former perpetrators and collaborators
into the postwar social and political order— discouraged historical reflection
as well.20 The acute geopolitical tensions caused by the cold war further
contributed to this trend, with memories of the war years being tendentiously
reconfigured (in both the West and the East) to suit the dictates of postwar
politics. To be sure, the recent past was not entirely avoided. Certain aspects
of the war years were discussed in the media, invoked by politicians, and
portrayed in popular culture.21 But when Europeans did mark the past, they did
19
Martha Minow’s book Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after
Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston, 1999) offers a thoughtful typology of the legal,
economic, symbolic, and commemorative methods that have been successfully used to
come to terms with difficult pasts.
20
The postwar failure of various countries, such as Germany, Italy, and France, to
remove the supporters of prewar and wartime dictatorial regimes after 1945 has been
the subject of a large specialized literature, which I will not cite here. For a general
discussion, see Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York,
2005), chap. 2.
21 In the case of Germany, Jeffrey Herf’s study Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in
the Two Germanies (Cambridge, MA, 1997) and Robert Moeller’s book War Stories:
The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley, 2003)
clearly reveal the absence of “repression.” So too does Lawrence Baron’s essay “The
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so in self-centered, rather than “other”-centered, ways that enabled them to
focus on their own suffering and evade a sense of guilt for the suffering of
others.22 This practice entailed a delicate balancing act, of course, and because
of the past’s acute sensitivity, most Europeans simply preferred to focus on
the present and future. The future-oriented mind-set that took shape in these
years was a crucial foundation for the continent’s postwar recovery.23 But one
does not have to accept the problematic Freudian concept of the “return of the
repressed” to recognize that the magnitude and complexity of the war years’
legacy would make it difficult to keep the past at arm’s length indefinitely.
Europe was not the only part of the world, moreover, that was burdened
with difficult historical legacies. In Asia, the crimes committed by the Japanese in China, Korea, the Philippines, and other occupied parts of the continent during World War II left a legacy of trauma and resentment very similar
to the one bequeathed by the Nazis to Europe.24 In the United States, there was
no comparable history of guilt or victimization from the Second World War,
but the nation’s long-standing evasion of the historic maltreatment of African
Americans and Native Americans left it with a set of unmastered pasts that
posed their own challenges.25 Finally, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century

Holocaust and American Public Memory, 1945–1960,” Holocaust and Genocide
Studies 17, no. 1 (2003): 62– 88, which describes the absence of repression in discussions of the Holocaust among American Jews in the early postwar period.
22 Eric Langenbacher alludes to this dynamic in “Changing Memory Regimes in
Contemporary Germany?” German Politics and Society, Summer 2003, 52.
23 Hermann Lübbe earned considerable criticism for proposing this idea in the
1980s. Hermann Lübbe, “Der Nationalsozialismus im politischen Bewusstsein der
Gegenwart,” in Deutschlands Weg in die Diktatur: Internationale Konferenz zur
Nationalsozialistischen Machtübernahme im Reichstagsgebäude zu Berlin, ed. Martin
Broszat (Berlin, 1983), 329 – 49. More recently, it has been embraced by Tony Judt,
“The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” Daedalus, Fall
1992, 95–96. See also Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, eds., Life after Death:
Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s
(Cambridge, 2003).
24
Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New
York, 1994); Joshua Fogel, ed., The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography
(Berkeley, 2000); Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking (New York, 1998); Erna Paris,
Long Shadows: Truth, Lies, and History (London, 2002), chap. 3.
25
Following the Civil War and the end of Reconstruction, American society’s hasty
pursuit of sectional reconciliation contributed to the emergence of a dominant white
memory of the recent past that ignored the horrors of slavery. For more on this process,
see Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory, chap. 4; David Blight, Race and Reunion:
The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, MA, 2001); William Blair, Cities of
the Dead: Contesting the Memory of the Civil War in the South, 1865–1914 (Chapel
Hill, NC, 2004); W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past: A Clash of Race and
Memory (Cambridge, MA, 2005). Similarly, early twentieth-century episodes of racial
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atrocities perpetrated by Western nations against their colonial possessions
(such as Belgium’s murderous rule of the Congo) and mid-twentieth-century
atrocities perpetrated by recently liberated nations against one another in the
wake of decolonization (as in postpartition India and Pakistan) constituted
other unmastered pasts around the globe. They, too, would figure centrally in
the eventual memory boom.

GENERATIONAL CHANGE
It took time, of course, before these historical legacies could be confronted.
Many factors were involved in directing attention toward them. In the West,
one of the more important ones was the generational turnover that took place
during the tumultuous decade of the 1960s.26 The generation that came of age
after World War II was a future-oriented generation whose members yearned
to replace what they saw as the hopelessly conservative political and economic order with a radical, left-leaning program of social and political change.
Yet while this generation largely pursued its radical goals via concrete action
in the present—through campus sit-ins, street demonstrations, and eventually
revolutionary violence in the fateful year of 1968 —it also mobilized the
buried past to challenge the hated status quo. The young people of this
generation were not responsible for their countries’ historical misdeeds and
thus had few inhibitions about moralistically holding their parents and grandparents accountable for them. In Europe and the United States, an overdue
process of historical reckoning began. In West Germany, left-leaning youth
attacked the centrist Christian Democratic and Social Democratic coalition
government by comparing its actions to those of the Third Reich.27 The same

violence have disappeared from public memory, having been obscured by veils of
silence, shame, and ignorance. Scott Ellsworth, Death in a Promised Land: The Tulsa
Race Riot of 1921 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1992); Tim Madigan, The Burning: Massacre,
Destruction, and the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 (New York, 2001), esp. chap. 15;
Michael D’Orso, Like Judgement Day: The Ruin and Redemption of a Town Called
Rosewood (New York, 1996). The persecution of Native Americans, meanwhile, was
never really even conceptualized as a historic injustice. Steven Conn, History’s
Shadow: Native Americans and Historical Consciousness in the Nineteenth Century
(Chicago, 2004).
26
Claudio Fogu and Wulf Kansteiner address this point in their essay “The Politics
of Memory and the Poetics of History,” in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, Politics of
Memory, 296 –97.
27 For the generation of 1968, the presence of ex-Nazis, such as Chancellor KurtGeorg Kiesinger, in the postwar state establishment; the passing of the emergency laws
(Notstandsgesetze) by the parliament; and the heavy-handed police suppression of
student protests confirmed its fears that the postwar Federal Republic was little
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trend appeared in France and Italy, where young people assailed the ruling
regimes by challenging state-sponsored myths of wartime antifascist resistance.28 In the United States, meanwhile, the civil rights and pan-Indian
movements implicitly challenged dominant official and popular memories of
the past by demanding that long-ignored historical injustices be acknowledged
and redressed.29 In short, the 1968 generation’s fight for social and political
justice in the present fostered a growing effort to confront the sins of the past.

IDEOLOGICAL
OF MEMORY

EXHAUSTION, IDENTITY POLITICS,

AND THE

POLITICIZATION

Yet, it was not so much the ambitious hopes of the 1968 generation but the
failure to realize them that contributed to the eventual memory boom. When
the attempt to overthrow the industrial capitalist order failed in the abortive
revolutions of 1968, many European and American leftists became skeptical
about the viability of socialism as a collective project. As a result of this
ideological exhaustion, many leftists during the 1970s began to shift their
political engagement away from a universalistic “politics of redistribution”
toward a more particularistic “politics of recognition” that aimed to secure
greater social and political rights for specific constituencies (esp. women,
ethnic minorities, and homosexuals).30 These new movements, which came to
be classified under the headings of “identity politics” and “multiculturalism”
after the 1970s and 1980s, developed a strong interest in memory, for a crucial
part of their present-day political engagement was their quest to redress
long-standing legacies of oppression and discrimination.31 Especially as these

different from the Nazi dictatorship. For a convincing analysis of this generation’s
views of the Nazi past, see Nick Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany:
A Social History of Dissent and Democracy (Oxford, 2003).
28
On France, see Rousso, Vichy Syndrome, esp. chap. 3. In Italy, the 1968 generation criticized its elders in the center-left governing coalition for abandoning the
wartime resistance’s real revolutionary potential and for hiding the continuities between the fascist and postwar eras. See Claudio Fogu, “Italiani brava gente: The
Legacy of Fascist Historical Culture on Italian Politics of Memory,” in Lebow,
Kansteiner, and Fogu, Politics of Memory, 149, 153–56.
29
W. Fitzhugh Brundage asserts that it has been “since the 1960s [that] . . . the
contest over . . . the southern past . . . has entered the public arena more directly than
at any time since Reconstruction” (Brundage, Southern Past, 313, 274). Native American demands for redress were already emerging in the early years after World War II
but intensified after 1960 (Barkan, Guilt of Nations, 173 and, more generally, chap. 8).
30 John Torpey, “Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: Reflections on Reparations,” Journal of Modern History 73 (June 2001): 352.
31 Various scholars have pointed to the importance of identity politics for the
memory boom. See Maier, “Surfeit of Memory?” 144 – 47; Klein, “On the Emer-
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new movements dovetailed with the concurrent historiographical phenomena
of oral history and the history of everyday life (Alltagsgeschichte)— both of
which accorded significance to the memories of ordinary people—they succeeded in forming countermemories of specific historical legacies that fought
for attention and inclusion within their nations’ dominant official memories.
In this context, Western European blue-collar workers, European and American Jews, and Japanese and African Americans, to name merely a few
groups, increasingly began to find a voice for, and demand the acknowledgement of, their experiences of oppression.
Just as the exhaustion of socialism promoted the turn to memory, so too did
the exhaustion of another ideology, nationalism.32 Nationalism, of course, had
been substantially discredited throughout Europe due to the horrors of the
Second World War, but various postwar trends weakened the idea of the
nation-state still further. The onset of decolonization and the eruption of crises
stemming from it, whether at Suez or in Algeria, forced European imperial
powers like Great Britain and France to accept diminished roles for themselves as nation-states on the world stage and to reassess their larger national
identities. This process of national self-reevaluation was further promoted by
the massive waves of immigration to Europe from the former colonies and
other parts of the developing world. For nations that had long been relatively
homogenous in their social composition, the striking increase in ethnic and
religious diversity led many Europeans to sense a weakening of national
identity. With France experiencing these geopolitical and social trends most
dramatically, it was no wonder that it was a French scholar, Pierre Nora, who
identified the growing interest in collective memory as part of a compensatory
desire to offset the loss of a unified national identity in an era of rapid social
transformation.33 By wistfully pointing to the significance of lieux de mémoire—the “sites of memory” in France where shared representations of the
past had once (but no longer) coalesced—Nora revealed how memory could
appeal to a nostalgic, if not conservative, sensibility.34 In the process, his work
pointed to a trend of considerable future significance—namely, the fact that

gence,” 143; Müller, “Introduction,” 16; Winter, Remembering War, 34 –36. Pierre
Nora has written that “those who have long been marginalized in traditional history
are . . . haunted by the need to recover their buried pasts” (Pierre Nora, “Between
Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 [Spring 1989]: 15).
Barkan cites multiculturalism’s promotion of the “neo-enlightenment” idea of group
rights as influencing the subsequent emergence of the global restitution movement
(Barkan, Guilt of Nations, 161).
32 Maier, “Surfeit of Memory?” 147; Torpey, “Making Whole What Has Been
Smashed,” 241, 247.
33 Nora, “Between Memory and History.”
34 The conservative thrust of Nora’s project has been identified by Steven Englund
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while the social fragmentation within Western European nations after 1968
inspired many left liberals to embrace a multiplicity of countermemories, it
eventually also prompted conservatives to reassert a dominant, consensual
form of official memory.
The result of this politically ecumenical mnemonic trend was the increasing
politicization of memory during the 1970s and 1980s. Public disputes over
memory became more common in these years as liberals and conservatives
mobilized the past for partisan purposes. These disputes, which were the
immediate precursors to the later memory boom, largely revolved around the
extent to which specific historical legacies should be viewed from a moralistic
perspective. If the young people of the 1968 generation had consciously
embraced morally informed and highly critical views of their nations’ pasts,
conservatives responded by trying to reimpose a prouder, nationalistically
oriented historical perspective. In France in the 1970s, for example, presidents
Georges Pompidou and Valery Giscard d’Estaing responded to the increasingly critical view of the Vichy years (epitomized by Marcel Ophuls’s controversial 1971 film, The Sorrow and the Pity) by emphasizing the need to
“draw a veil over the past” and pursue reconciliation between the perpetrators
and victims.35 Similarly, in Germany during the 1980s, conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl rejected the 1968 generation’s inward historical critique
by trying to relativize the crimes of the Third Reich in order to establish a
“normal” sense of national identity—a mission that sparked the best known
disputes of the 1980s, the Bitburg controversy of 1985 and the Historians’
Debate of 1986 – 87.36 These and other disputes, such as the Waldheim affair
in Austria, which began in 1986, suggest that it was precisely the efforts of
conservatives in the 1980s to roll back the self-critical mnemonic impulses of
the preceding years that ended up motivating liberal groups to redouble their
efforts to confront unaddressed aspects of the past in the 1990s.

POSTMODERNISM
If the political and social realities of the 1960s helped to initiate the growing
interest in memory, subsequent intellectual and cultural trends during the
1970s nurtured it as well. Perhaps the most important development in this
period was the emergence of postmodernism.37 Although notoriously difficult

in his review essay “The Ghost of Nation Past,” Journal of Modern History 64 (June
1992): 299 –320.
35 Rousso, Vichy Syndrome, 123.
36 Geoffrey H. Hartmann, ed., Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington, IN, 1986); Maier, Unmasterable Past.
37 Barry Schwartz, “Introduction: The Expanding Past,” Qualitative Sociology
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to define, postmodern thought and culture grew out of the political disillusionment of the post-1968 era and ushered in a newly skeptical perspective
toward the prevailing ideas and values of Western life.38 Postmodern thought,
in particular, was influenced by the insight of French poststructuralists that
knowledge and truth were both functions of language that, rather than transparently reflecting reality, worked within systems of power to produce “discourses” that themselves subjectively created reality. This insight, made
famous by Michel Foucault, together with Jacques Derrida’s idea of supplementarity (which showed how meaning was linguistically produced via exclusion and negation), gave poststructuralist intellectuals powerful weapons to
“deconstruct” all kinds of hegemonic concepts that were rooted in binary
oppositions that repressed the otherness within them.
The deconstructionist impulse of postmodernism had profound implications
for the relationship between history and memory. Since the inception of the
modern historical profession, a relatively strict divide had been maintained
between history—widely regarded as an objective discipline that sought the
truth about the past—and memory, whose inherent subjectivity led it to be
seen as an inferior path to genuine historical understanding. Postmodern
thought, however, challenged the rigid polarization between history and memory by challenging the existence of objective truth itself. Indeed, as historians
became acquainted with postmodernism in the 1980s and 1990s, they began
to challenge history’s reputation for objectivity by showing that it, too, was
trapped within rules of language and composed through a subjective process
of representation strikingly similar to that which informed history’s alleged
“other,” memory.39 Building on this insight, many historians began to shift
their attention away from the prevailing focus on social history and make a
“cultural” or “linguistic” turn toward the study of representation and, before
long, memory itself.40 In short, as postmodernism made increasing numbers of
historians more skeptical about the truth claims of history, they began to shed

19, no. 3 (1996): 277–78; Klein, “On the Emergence,” 144; Winter, Remembering
War, 33.
38
Perry Anderson’s book The Origins of Postmodernity (London, 1998) cites the
slow death of socialism in the wake of the failed 1968 revolutions as crucial for leading
Western European intellectuals toward postmodern thought.
39
Many scholars have explored the implications of postmodernism for the field of
history. See, e.g., Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History (London, 1991). The idea of
memory as representation rather than recollection or retrieval is a major theme of the
neurobiological literature on memory. See, e.g., Schacter, Searching for Memory,
56 – 60.
40 Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 1–10. Moreover, as historians became more
self-reflexive about their own representation of the past, they became better able to take
more self-critical stances toward their nation’s historical legacies.
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their biases against, and become increasingly interested in, memory. In the
process, postmodernism helped pave the way for the later emergence of the
scholarly memory industry.

THE END

OF THE

COLD WAR

If postmodernism helped popularize memory as a topic of interest among
scholars, the end of the cold war helped to bring memory to the attention of
the general public.41 One important way that the end of the cold war contributed to the memory boom of the 1990s was by changing the directional
outlook of Western society at large. With the collapse of communist regimes
throughout Eastern Europe in the revolutions of 1989, it was not only socialism that was seen as having died but all future-oriented or utopian projects for
political change.42 This death of the future—the gloomy sense of “post-ness”
after 1989, as John Torpey has termed it— helped redirect the attention of
Western society toward the past.43
But it was not the past in a generic sense that was now revisited but rather
the many difficult historical legacies that had never been fully confronted
during the postwar era. If the general climate of insecurity and the calculating
imperatives of realpolitik had encouraged the embrace of self-justifying and
triumphalistic historical narratives during the cold war, the end of the EastWest conflict and the resulting sense of security enabled the emergence of
more morally informed and self-critical views of the past.44 This trend was
particularly visible in Germany, where, following unification in 1990, the
conservative Christian Democratic government of Helmut Kohl— having previously avoided taking responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi past in favor
of focusing on the misdeeds of the communist East German government in the
present—increasingly took significant steps to confront the legacy of the Nazi
years.45 Similarly, other Western European nations, such as France, Switzer41
Müller, “Introduction,” 6; Judt, “Past Is Another Country,” 108; Bill Niven,
Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich (London,
2002), introduction.
42
As Charles Maier put it in 1993, “At the end of the twentieth century, Western
societies have come to the end of a massive collective project, . . . of the capacity to
found collective institutions that rest on aspirations for the future” (Maier, “Surfeit of
Memory?” 147).
43
Torpey, “Making Whole What Has Been Smashed,” 241, 251.
44
Barkan, Guilt of Nations, xvi.
45 Müller, “Introduction” 4; Niven, Facing the Nazi Past, 2– 4. Whether in the form
of political pronouncements of regret for the Nazi era, the creation of national holidays
and memorials marking the Holocaust, economic measures to pay reparations to
survivors (particularly slave laborers), or intense debates over historical monographs,
memoirs, and museum exhibitions, the Germans took unprecedented responsibility for
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land, and Sweden, began to wrestle with their wartime histories of collaborating with the Nazis, while newly postauthoritarian nations like Spain confronted their own difficult pasts as well.46 In Eastern Europe, meanwhile, the
end of the cold war and the liberation from Soviet rule helped launch the
painful process of confronting long-buried histories, whether crimes committed during the Second World War or traumatic episodes associated with
decades of communist rule.47
To be sure, even as the security provided by the end of the cold war fostered
a turn toward the past, the uncertainties produced by it did so as well.48 In parts
of Europe, the cold war’s end unleashed such long-unseen forces as virulent
nationalism and right-wing political violence that raised the specter of bygone
atrocities from the Second World War. The crimes perpetrated by Serbs and
Croats against one another and against Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians during the Yugoslav civil war of the 1990s, for example, resurrected
images of the Nazi Holocaust and fueled a commitment to honor the mne-

the crimes of the Third Reich in the years leading up to, and following, the fiftieth
anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995.
46 Rousso, Vichy Syndrome; Georg Kreis, ed., Switzerland and the Second World
War (London, 2000); Richard J. Golsan, ed., Memory, the Holocaust, and French
Justice: The Bousquet and Touvier Affairs (Hanover, NH, 1996); Henry Rousso,
“Justice, History, and Memory in France: Reflections on the Papon Trial,” in Politics
and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustices, ed. John Torpey (Lanham, MD,
2003), 277–93; Tom Bower, Nazi Gold: The Full Story of the Fifty-Year Swiss-Nazi
Conspiracy to Steal Billions from Europe’s Jews and Holocaust Survivors (New York,
1997); Barkan, Guilt of Nations, chap. 5; Paloma Aguilar, “Justice, Politics, and
Memory in the Spanish Transition,” in De Brito, Enriquez, and Aguilar, Politics of
Memory, 92–118.
47
The renewed interest in the past was somewhat less self-critical in Eastern Europe
than in Western Europe. This trend reflected the reluctance of newly independent
nations to sully their newfound national pride by airing their dirty historical laundry in
public. Most preferred to see themselves as guiltless historical victims rather than
guilty historical perpetrators. In the former Yugoslavia, Serbs and Croats reembraced
historical memories of being victimized by one another in the Second World War;
Poles preferred to focus on their victimization by the Germans and the Soviets rather
than their own complicity in the murder of Polish Jews, and Czechs predictably
refrained from acknowledging the expulsion of ethnic Germans at the end of the war.
Judt, “Past Is Another Country,” 99 –100. See the controversy over Jan Gross’s book
Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (New
York, 2002); Antony Polonsky, The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the
Jedwabne Massacre in Poland (Princeton, NJ, 2003).
48 David Cesarani, “Holocaust Controversies in the 1990s: The Revenge of History
or the History of Revenge,” in After Eichmann: Collective Memory and the Holocaust
since 1961, ed. David Cesarani (London, 2005), 91–99.
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monic mandate “never again.”49 The wave of neo-Nazi violence against
foreigners in the early 1990s temporarily raised concerns about Germany’s
political reliability in the wake of reunification and stimulated a commitment
to accept the moral legacy of the Nazi era. And neofascist political agitation
against immigrants in France, Italy, and Austria motivated many citizens in
these countries to take responsibility for their own checkered pasts.
The wave of memory that swept Europe in the 1990s also extended to other
parts of the world. In the United States, historical injustices, ranging from the
internment of Japanese Americans in World War II to the persecution of
African Americans, were tackled at the highest levels of government and
investigated in the media.50 In Asia, Japan was increasingly pressured to admit
to having perpetrated horrific war crimes against subject peoples, whether the
infamous Nanking massacre, medical experiments against enemy POWs, or
the sexual exploitation of Korean “comfort women.”51 In Latin America,
various truth commissions took up the issue of “dirty wars” waged by
authoritarian governments in countries like Chile and Argentina against sus49 Alan Steinweis, “The Auschwitz Analogy: Holocaust Memory and American
Debates over Intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s,” Holocaust and
Genocide Studies 19, no. 2 (2005): 276 – 89.
50 The internment of Japanese Americans was confronted in the form of reparations,
apologies, and new commitments to documenting this forgotten history at specific
historic sites. Marita Sturken, “Absent Images of Memory: Remembering and Reenacting the Japanese Internment,” in Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), ed.
Takashi Fujitani (Durham, NC, 2001), 33– 49; Robert A. Jones, “Whitewashing Manzanar,” Los Angeles Times, April 10, 1996, B2. In the late 1990s, the topics of slavery
and Jim Crow– era violence against African Americans gained attention, with elite
universities probing their involvement in the slave trade, major newspapers apologizing for running advertisements for slaves, truth commissions established to probe early
twentieth-century race riots, memorials erected for forgotten lynching victims, and
larger discussions emerging in political circles about the possibility of reparations for
past persecution. Yale and Brown were among the universities that confronted their
slave-trading pasts. Kate Zernike, “Slave Traders in Yale’s Past Fuel Debate on
Restitution,” New York Times, August 13, 2001; Frances Fitzgerald, “Peculiar Institution: Brown University Looks at the Slave Traders in Its Past,” New York Times,
September 12, 2005; “A Newspaper Apologizes for Slave-Era Ads,” New York Times,
July 6, 2000, B1. On the Tulsa Race Riot Commission, see Madigan, Burning, chap.
16. The state legislature of North Carolina established the Wilmington Race Riot
Commission to unearth the truth of the horrific pogrom against blacks in 1898. Brent
Staples, “When Democracy Died in Wilmington, N.C.,” New York Times, January 8,
2006, 13. Monica Davey, “It Did Happen Here: The Lynching That a City Forgot,”
discusses the lynching of three black men in Minneapolis in 1920 (New York Times,
December 4, 2003, A22). On the issue of reparations for slavery see Roy L. Brooks,
ed., When Sorry Isn’t Enough (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 341– 61;
and Barkan, Guilt of Nations, chap. 12.
51 Peter Li, ed., Japanese War Crimes: The Search for Justice (New Brunswick, NJ,
2003); Barkan, Guilt of Nations, chap. 3; Fujitani, Perilous Memories.
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pected leftist insurgents and civilians.52 In Africa, the maltreatment of blacks
under the racist apartheid regime in South Africa was confronted in truth
commissions, while older atrocities, such as the genocide of the Hereros in
German Southwest Africa (today, Namibia), also earned newfound attention.53
Similar crimes from the imperialist era were confronted in places like Australia, where the government apologized for the maltreatment of Aborigines.54
Even major transnational entities, such as the Catholic Church, participated in
the memory boom, issuing a series of major apologies for crimes committed
over the centuries against religious dissenters, native peoples in the New
World, and Jews.55

FROM

THE

MEMORY BOOM

TO THE

MEMORY INDUSTRY

As the memory boom of the 1990s left few parts of the world untouched, it
was little wonder that the burgeoning scholarly interest in memory came to be
seen as an outright industry around the same time.56 The wave of scholarship
that came to comprise this “industry” has been well documented by scholars
and is too vast to be discussed in depth in the limited space of this essay.57
Still, several basic facts are worth restating. Perhaps the most important point
52 Alexandra Barahona De Brito, “Truth, Justice, Memory, and Democratization in
the Southern Cone,” in De Brito, Enriquez, and Aguilar, Politics of Memory, 119 – 60;
Sharon F. Lean, “Is Truth Enough? Reparations and Reconciliation in Latin America,”
in Torpey, Politics and the Past, 169 –92.
53 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, chap. 4; Annie E. Coombes,
History after Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public Memory in a Democratic South
Africa (Durham, NC, 2003). On the memory of the Herero genocide, see the work of
Reinhart Kössler, much of which is summed up in “Awakened from Colonial Amnesia? Germany after 2004,” http://www.freiburg-postkolonial.de/Seiten/koesslercolonial-amnesia.htm.
54
“Australia Expresses Regret for Injustice to Aborigines,” New York Times, August
27, 1999, A14; see Dirk Moses, ed., Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence
and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History (New York, 2004).
55
Paul Vallely, “A Sorry Business,” London Independent, December 19, 1998; “The
Vatican and the Holocaust,” New York Times, March 17, 1998.
56
Only the Middle East largely escaped the wave of historical self-examination.
Although Israel witnessed the emergence of the controversial “post-Zionist” school of
historians, which subjected reigning historical myths to critical scrutiny, most Arab
and Muslim nations, being authoritarian societies, did not enjoy the same freedom of
expression present in the newly postauthoritarian nations of the world and continued
to adhere to distorted, if politically expedient, views of the past. See the special issue
of History and Memory entitled “Israeli Historiography Revisited,” vol. 7, no. 1
(Spring/Summer) 1995. The rise of post-Zionism can be partly explained by the
comparatively secure post-Oslo climate of the early and mid-1990s.
57 Much of the literature is discussed in Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins’s essay,
“Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of
Mnemonic Practices,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 105– 40.
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to emphasize is that the scholarly interest in memory clearly predated the
memory boom. As Patrick Hutton has pointed out, it was the cultural turn in
Western historiography in the 1970s—specifically the new focus on mentalités, or structures of cultural perception—that helped give rise to the first
important works on memory in the early 1980s, such as Eric Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (1983), Pierre Nora’s Les Lieux
de Mémoire (1984), and Yosef Yerushalmi’s Zakhor: Jewish History and
Jewish Memory (1982), not to mention the rediscovery of Maurice Halbwachs’s pioneering work on collective memory from the early twentieth
century.58 These early studies, which focused on the role of remembrance in
the forging of national or group identity in the modern world (as well as on
the alleged threat posed to “organic” memory by modern forms of historical
consciousness), constituted the first major branch of the emerging field of
memory studies. This branch’s studies addressed a variety of topics, but they
were all generally influenced by growing concerns about the weakening of
national or group cohesion in what was increasingly being recognized as a
postcolonial and postmodern era. Pierre Nora’s important study was particularly influenced by the adverse impact of postwar immigration, post-1968
political anomie, and post-Vatican II secularism on French national identity.59
Similarly, Hobsbawm and Ranger’s work, like British geographer David
Lowenthal’s equally pioneering study, The Past Is a Foreign Country, was
shaped by the growing nostalgia for the glories of the British past during the
bleak 1970s and Thatcherite 1980s.60 In these two countries and elsewhere,
Nora’s famous lament, “We speak of memory because there is so little of it
left,” reflected the growing concern of many that modern forces were attenuating group memory and identity.61
Around the same time, a second branch of memory studies was being
established that focused on the persistence of unmastered pasts in the contemporary world. Influenced by the growing centrality of the Holocaust in
Western cultural and intellectual life, this branch of scholarship was pioneered
58
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (New York,
1983); Pierre Nora’s Les Lieux de Mémoire appeared in English as Pierre Nora and
Lawrence D. Kritzman, eds., Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, vols.
1–3 (New York, 1996 –98); Yosef Yerushalmi’s Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish
Memory (New York, 1989); Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 1–10. Hutton cites
the work of Philippe Ariès as inaugurating this field of scholarship, which also includes
such works as Maurice Agulhon’s Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and
Symbolism in France (Cambridge, 1981).
59 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, “Remembered Realms: Pierre Nora and French National Memory,” American Historical Review, June 2001, 909, 912.
60 Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain, 1900 –2000 (New York, 2004), 379 – 80,
386 – 87; David Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country (Cambridge, 1985).
61 Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 7.
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by scholars such as Saul Friedländer, whose self-reflexive early studies, When
Memory Comes (1978) and Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and
Death (1982), set the stage for later works, whether on the legacy of the Nazi
genocide, by such figures as Charles Maier, Henry Rousso, and Tom Segev,
or on other contested events in American and European history, by Michael
Kammen, Adam Hochschild, and Tina Rosenberg, among many others.62
These studies on unmastered pasts, together with the studies on memory and
national identity and other related works on the theoretical dimensions of
memory, appeared in ever-increasing numbers during the 1980s and 1990s.63
But it was the study of unmastered pasts that arguably experienced the most
notable success, its fortunes having been boosted by the “boom” in public
debates about divisive historical legacies following the end of the cold war.64
As the general public became increasingly aware of, and interested in, such
debates and as more and more scholars began examining them in analytical
fashion, the status of memory studies as a burgeoning field of scholarship was
quickly upgraded. Even though the study of memory predated the memory
boom itself, the latter directly contributed to the belief that the former had
become a full-fledged industry.
By the turn of the millennium, the memory boom and the emerging memory
62 Saul Friedländer, When Memory Comes (originally published in French in Paris,
1978), and Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death (New York, 1982);
Maier, Unmasterable Past; Segev, Seventh Million; Rousso, Vichy Syndrome. See also
Buruma’s Wages of Guilt. Other works that followed in this tradition and examined the
cultural and intellectual impact of memory include (to mention merely examples on the
topic of the Third Reich) Alvin Rosenfeld, Imagining Hitler (Bloomington, IN, 1985);
Anton Kaes, From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film (Cambridge, MA,
1989); Saul Friedländer, ed., Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the
“Final Solution” (Cambridge, MA, 1992); James Young, The Texture of Memory:
Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven, CT, 1993); and Ernestine Schlant,
The Language of Silence: West German Literature and the Holocaust (New York,
1999). Other studies followed on the unmastered pasts of other countries, including
Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory; Adam Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost: Russians
Remember Stalin (New York, 1994); Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing
Europe’s Ghosts after Communism (New York, 1995).
63
Other works that examined the links between memory and national identity
included John R. Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity
(Princeton, NJ, 1994); Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the
Making of the Israeli National Tradition (Chicago, 1995); Alon Confino, The Nation
as a Local Metaphor: Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918 (Chapel
Hill, NC, 1997). Theoretical works on memory included Assmann and Holscher,
Kultur und Gedächtnis; Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge, 1989);
Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory
(New Brunswick, NJ, 1994).
64 Listing even only the most significant studies from this wave of scholarship would
exceed the boundaries of this article.
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industry made the subject of memory an indisputable phenomenon. Signs of
memory’s new prominence were visible nearly everywhere. Scholars from
multiple disciplines in the humanities and social sciences began to gravitate to
the study of memory, books on the subject started to proliferate as never
before, journals devoted exclusively to the study of memory were founded,
Internet discussion groups were established, university presses created special
series dedicated to the topic, and innumerable academic conferences were
held to explore its diverse dimensions.65 With the mainstream media also
getting into the act and devoting attention to covering controversies over
monuments, museums, trials, truth commissions, and reparations payments
around the world, memory became virtually inescapable in everyday life.

THE FUTURE

OF

MEMORY

Whether memory will remain a permanent fixture within contemporary life,
however, is open to question. Some scholars, such as Jay Winter, have argued
that “it is unlikely that the memory boom will fade in the foreseeable future”
due to the likely persistence of one of the main factors that helped give rise
to it in the first place—the traumatic experience of war.66 As discussed above,
however, war is hardly the only factor responsible for the memory boom.
Moreover, while war may regrettably persist in the future, some of the other
factors that originally brought forth the boom have begun to wane in recent
years. Finally, since the turn of the millennium, new political, cultural, and
social trends have emerged that may begin to erode memory’s influence in the
public sphere as well. In short, we may be entering a period that may not be
able to sustain the same interest in memory as the one that originally stimulated it in the first place.

65
In 1987, the leading journal in the field of memory studies, History and Memory,
was founded, and in 1998 Stanford University Press established its book series,
Cultural Memory and the Present. Among the more significant conferences were “The
Future of Memory,” at Yale University in October 1992, “Germany, Jews, and the
Future of Memory” at Princeton University in April 1999, and “Confronting the Past:
Memory, Identity, and Society” at the University of California, Los Angeles, in
January 2001. In 2007, the new journal Memory Studies (published by SAGE journals)
was founded, and a new Internet listserve H-Memory was established. The first source
readers on memory appeared as well. See Michael Rossington and Anne Whiteread,
eds., Theories of Memory: A Reader (Baltimore, 2007); and Jeffrey Olick, Vered
Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, eds., The Collective Memory Reader (Oxford,
2008).
66 Winter, Remembering War, 8.
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PROGRESS

IN

COMING

TO

TERMS

WITH THE

PAST

If the existence of unmastered pasts was an initial precondition for the
memory boom, the substantial progress made in Europe and other parts of the
world in openly confronting them raises the theoretical possibility of mnemonic closure and an eventual end to the recent preoccupation with memory.67
This possibility is particularly suggested by the case of Germany, whose
recent engagement with the Nazi past has been praised effusively by scholars.68 The fact that one of Germany’s most eminent (and usually most critical)
historians, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, noted not too long ago that “the Federal
Republic has brilliantly faced up to the Nazi past” is a testament to the
considerable progress achieved by the nation over the course of the last
decade.69 So successful has Germany been, according to John Torpey, that the
country has essentially “set a standard of reckoning with the past that others
have been forced to confront.”70 In light of such progress, it is worth asking
whether Germany can possibly sustain its intense engagement with its Nazi
legacy in the years to come. While answers to this question are necessarily
speculative, anecdotal evidence suggests that the nation may not continue to
interrogate the Nazi era as energetically as before. Already in 1995, German
historian Peter Reichel asserted that “public memory has become [so] institutionalized and commercially organized, . . . [so] admirably exhibited, administered, and politically neutralized . . . [that] it is extremely doubtful that
the recent intensity of the debates about the formation of [Germany’s] mem-

67 The question of whether any past can truly be “mastered” still awaits a definitive
answer from scholars. Some, like Eric Langenbacher, have openly spoken about the
possibility of closure. See Langenbacher, “Changing Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany?” 54. By contrast, Charles Maier has written that “historical narratives
finally end . . . not when there is agreement on one narrative . . . [but when] clarification is reached on two or perhaps three basic stories, whose representatives understand
the issues that separate them . . . and agree to live . . . side by side” (Charles S. Maier,
“Overcoming the Past? Narrative and Negotiation, Remembering, and Reparation:
Issues at the Interface of History and Law,” in Torpey, Politics and the Past, 302).
68
John Torpey, “Introduction,” in Torpey, Politics and the Past, 2.
69
“Bravourös bewältigt,” Die Welt am Sonntag, May 8, 2005. Bill Niven’s Facing
the Nazi Past is one of the more upbeat analyses of recent German memory. Already
in 1981, Peter Steinbach described the Germans’ postwar relationship to the Nazi era
as a “radical confrontation with the past, singular in human history” (Peter Steinbach,
Nationalsozialistische Gewaltverbrechen: Die Diskussion in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit nach 1945 [Berlin, 1981], 8). To be sure, dissenters exist. Some critics of
Germany’s new form of national identity have dubbed it a perverse form of pride in sin
(Sündenstolz). See Richard Herzinger, “Am Anfang der Wahrheit,” Die Zeit, no. 51,
2003.
70 Torpey, “Introduction,” 2.
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ory landscape will last much longer.”71 To be sure, more than a decade has
passed, and Reichel’s assertion has still not been fully borne out. But his larger
point may eventually prove to be true; namely, that as the German confrontation with the Nazi era becomes more systematized over time, it will gradually lose its original sense of urgency.
Suggestive signs that Germany’s “memory work” may soon be slowing
down have increased of late. After a period of intense commemorative
attention toward the sixtieth anniversary of the events of World War II over
the last several years, the conclusion of the ceremonies in 2005 means that
Germans will, in all likelihood, take a break from their recent rigorous
schedule of commemoration for the remainder of the decade. This is especially probable as the upcoming seventieth anniversary commemorations of
the Second World War, set to begin in 2009, may be relatively modest in scale
out of deference to the more numerically significant seventy-fifth anniversary
events, which are approaching in 2014.72 There is also the possibility that the
seventy-fifth anniversary events will be overshadowed by the centennial
ceremonies for World War I, which will begin the same year. Moreover, if
recent trends continue to hold, future commemorations of the Second World
War, when they do occur, should be relatively free of controversy. Just as the
May 8, 2005, ceremonies were far less contentious than those of 1995 and
1985 (largely due to the greater willingness of England, France, the United
States, and Russia to invite Germany to participate in them), there is little
reason, at least at present, to suspect that the commemorations half a decade
from now will not reflect this normalizing trend.73
As with commemorative anniversaries, the same trend may surface in other
71 Peter Reichel, Politik mit der Erinnerung: Gedächtnisorte im Streit um die
Nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit (Munich, 1995), 326.
72
They will also face competition from the twentieth anniversary celebrations
marking the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990.
73
It was Germany’s exclusion from the D-day commemoration ceremonies of 1984
that led Helmut Kohl to stage the controversial Bitburg ceremony of May 5, 1985. By
1995, however, Kohl was treated much more fraternally as one of the “Allies,” being
invited to London to the end of the war commemoration ceremonies on May 8 and
hosting the leaders (or acting representatives) of England, France, Russia, and other
countries in Berlin on May 8, 1995. See Niven, Facing the Nazi Past, chap. 4. Still, the
1995 ceremonies were partially overshadowed by a controversial right-wing German
manifesto, “May 8, 1945—against Forgetting,” which demanded that more attention be
paid to German suffering during the war. By contrast, the ceremonies a decade later
were quite calm, marked by the first-time inclusion of Germany at the June 2004 D-day
commemorative ceremonies and the May 9, 2005, ceremonies in Moscow— both of
which, according to Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, symbolically marked the “final
end” to World War II and the postwar era. “For the Germans, the War’s Ambiguities
Persist,” International Herald Tribune, June 7, 2004, 1; Knut Pries, “Zyklus des
Gedenkens,” Die Frankfurter Rundschau, May 9, 2005.
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areas of German life. In the heretofore hotly contested realm of monuments,
the recent completion of Germany’s central Memorial to the Murdered Jews
of Europe in Berlin in 2005 will likely bring to a close the emotional,
two-decade-long national discussion over how to commemorate the Holocaust
in public fashion.74 Meanwhile, in the area of politics, Angela Merkel’s short
tenure as chancellor since 2005 has thus far borne out media predictions that,
as a representative of a younger generation of Germans, she would not share
her predecessors’ preoccupation with the Nazi past and would probably
abstain from becoming embroiled in the larger politics of memory.75 Finally,
the possibility that Germany’s Nazi past is weighing less heavily upon the
nation these days is suggested by the growing readiness of ordinary Germans
to display a normal sense of national pride, as was amply revealed—and much
commented upon— during the nation’s hosting of the 2006 World Cup.76 To
be sure, as was shown by the recent flap over Günter Grass’s disclosure in
2006 of his membership in the Waffen-SS, controversies over the Nazi era
will not disappear entirely. Moreover, the achievements of official memory
may not fully reflect (or influence) the realities of popular memory, as is
demonstrated by the persistence of neo-Nazism and xenophobia within certain
segments of German society. Still, a more normalized and less emotionally
fraught relationship to the Nazi past seems to be more of a reality these days
than ever before.
If these suppositions are correct, then it is worth asking whether Germany’s
future course of memory work will set a precedent for other nations’ confrontations with their own historical legacies and for the “memory boom” in
general. Predicting the end of general phenomena based upon individual (and
potentially isolated) cases can be hazardous, of course. Even if the Germans
begin to reduce their attention to their own troubled past in the future, it does
not follow that memory will evaporate as a global concern any time soon.
After all, even in certain countries that have made strides in atoning for past
historical injustices—for example, the United States or France—work remains
to be done, particularly with respect to the legacies of slavery and colonialism.77 Meanwhile, other nations, such as Japan and Russia, seem unable to
74
To be sure, monuments will continue to be built at the local level in Germany but
probably without the pathos or publicity of the Berlin debate.
75
“Germany Passes Torch to New Generation,” New York Times, November 22,
2005, A3.
76
Richard Bernstein, “In World Cup Surprise, Flags Fly with German Pride,” New
York Times, June 18, 2006; Roger Cohen, “Germany and the Cup: A Liberating
Normality,” New York Times, June 17, 2006.
77 Michael Bess has argued that France has mastered the legacy of Vichy. Michael
Bess, Choices under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II (New York, 2006), 323.
Yet the legacy of colonial rule in Algeria continues to haunt the nation. See William
Cohen, “The Algerian War and French Memory,” Contemporary European History 9,
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decisively adopt self-critical perspectives toward their pasts, especially their
behavior in the Second World War.78 And still others, such as Turkey and
China, have barely begun to confront such difficult legacies as the Armenian
genocide and the Cultural Revolution.79 Considering the fact that many parts
of the world have unfinished historical business to attend to—the communist
past in Eastern Europe, the legacies of colonial rule and postcolonial dictatorships in Latin America and Africa, and the experience of war and political
violence in the Middle East all come to mind—the topic of memory will
hardly disappear anytime soon. Still, any exercise in trend spotting always
aims to identify the crest of the wave as a sign of things to come. And so, at
the risk of flirting with overly teleological thinking, I think it would be a
mistake to ignore the theoretical implications of Germany’s increasingly
successful managing of its past for other nations in the future. Even if it never
reaches any abstract point of closure, Germany’s trajectory of remembrance
may be that of other nations in the long run.
This possibility seems more likely than not in light of the growing recognition that confronting painful pasts has become a major factor in determining
the political legitimacy of modern nation-states. As Helmut Dubiel has noted,
a new “culture of legitimation” has emerged throughout the world that is
defined by “the abandonment of the traditional ‘positive’ form of political
legitimation”—typically marked by “triumphalistic assertions of national history”—in favor of one that “incorporates the remorseful commemoration of
collective injustice” perpetrated by nations at some point in their past.80 This
strategy makes not only political sense, moreover, but also economic sense, as
political elites have realized that gaining the moral high ground by confronting

no. 3 (2000): 489 –500. In the United States, the legacy of slavery continues to spark
calls for apologies and reparations. See Jonathan Capehart, “Contrition for America’s
Curse,” Washington Post, April 12, 2007, A27.
78
Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe’s recent denial of wartime sex slavery caused
outrage in Asia during the spring of 2007. Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan Repeats Denial of
Role in World War II Sex Slavery,” New York Times, March 17, 2007, 4. Russia’s
angry reaction to Estonia’s dismantling of a Soviet-era World War II memorial in 2007
reflects the nation’s ongoing reluctance to question its mythologized view of the
Second World War. Steven Lee Myers, “After Violent Night, Estonia Removes a
Soviet-Era Memorial,” New York Times, April 28, 2007, A8. See also Nina Tumarkin,
The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New
York, 1994).
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See the New York Times editorial “Turkey, Armenia and Denial,” May 16, 2006.
On China’s reluctance to confront the crimes of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, see
“Ignoring the Past: China,” Economist, May 20, 2006.
80 Helmut Dubiel, Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte: Die Nationalsozialistische
Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages (Munich, 1999), 290, 292. See
also Barkan, Guilt of Nations, xi.
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their countries’ difficult pasts is “good for business” and can help attract
economic investment.81 These trends reveal that for nations to retain their
legitimacy and ensure their prosperity in the future, the extent to which they
embark upon a process of historical reckoning will be decisive. In this regard,
John Torpey’s comment that “we are all Germans now” appropriately recognizes the standard set by Germany for the rest of the world.82 And yet, this
trend, however encouraging, has ambiguous implications for memory’s future. For at the same time that the institutionalization of remembrance as a
basic principle of the modern state’s political legitimacy symbolizes memory’s heightened influence, it also suggests that its influence may well be
peaking and will have nowhere left to go but down.
This scenario has been implied by various scholars who have recently
predicted an imminent end to the memory boom. In assessing Europe’s history
since 1945 in his recent book, Postwar, Tony Judt has written, “The first
postwar Europe was built upon . . . forgetting as a way of life. Since 1989,
Europe has been constructed . . . upon a compensatory surplus of memory:
institutionalized public remembering as the very foundation of collective
identity. The first could not endure—but nor will the second.”83 Echoing this
point in a recent review of Judt’s book, Charles Maier has claimed that one of
the most “powerful European development[s]” of recent years is the “outgrowing of memory,” observing that “whoever passes through a European
airport and looks at the young or even middle aged professionals boarding a
flight from London to Frankfurt, or Paris to Rome, must come away with the
sense that the struggles of the postwar period are irretrievably past.”84 In light
of such observations, it is possible that the memory boom’s success may
eventually prove to be its undoing.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,

AND THE

END

OF THE

POST–COLD WAR ERA

Another reason for the possible future decline of memory as a cultural
phenomenon is the dramatically new political context that has emerged world81
Economic motives were directly involved in Switzerland’s decision to establish a
five-billion-dollar fund for Holocaust victims who lost money in Swiss banks. Barkan,
Guilt of Nations, xvi. Similarly, Montgomery, Alabama, has begun to market its
progressive confrontation with segregation and the civil rights movement as a means
of luring business to the city and region at large. See Tony Horwitz, Confederates in
the Attic: Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil War (New York, 1998), 357–58. The
NAACP’s decision in 1999 to launch an economic boycott of South Carolina in order
to halt the flying of the confederate flag over the state house in Columbia is another
example of what might be called the “economics of memory.”
82 Torpey, “Introduction,” 3.
83 Tony Judt, Postwar, 829.
84 Charles Maier, “Europa Europa,” Nation, January 9, 2006, 24.
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wide since September 11, 2001. As noted above, some observers have interpreted the memory boom of the 1990s as a byproduct of the “death of the
future”—that is, the general retreat from progressive political activism following the cold war’s end. In this sense, the surge of interest in memory could
arguably be seen as something of a luxury made possible by the arrival of a
comparatively secure, postideological world without major political threats to
worry about or causes to pursue.85 If true (and the point is debatable), then the
sudden return of ideological struggle and insecurity in the wake of the
September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the global spread of radical Islamic terrorism have
dramatically changed the dominant political context throughout the world.86
For this reason, it is questionable whether the focus on memory— on struggles
over the past—will maintain its current relevance in a world facing major
crises in the present. Terrorism is hardly the only threat facing the West today.
The destabilizing behavior of aspiring or existing nuclear nation-states, such
as Iran and North Korea, the rise of China and India as major economic
competitors to the West, and the worrisome prospect of global warming all
represent serious threats as well. As these challenges become more acute, they
may eventually make the 1990s look like a blissfully naive belle epoque in
retrospect—an interlude between the cessation of the cold war and the dawning of an era still to be defined. In such a world, the study of memory, seen
as so urgently necessary in the comparatively relaxed 1990s, may increasingly
appear to be a luxury that a new era of crisis can ill afford.

THE END

OF IDENTITY

POLITICS

In today’s dramatically supercharged political climate, it is arguable, furthermore, that another factor that originally boosted the interest in memory—the
rise of identity politics and multiculturalism—is beginning to decline as well.
If it was the comparatively postpolitical atmosphere of the 1990s that allowed
identity politics to thrive, the return of political crisis since September 11 has
led some observers to brand identity politics a “self-indulgent” pursuit unbefitting of changing times.87 No wonder, then, that increasing numbers of
journalists and other pundits have begun to proclaim the “death” or “end” of
85
This is the implication of Charles Maier’s essay “Surfeit of Memory?” and John
Torpey’s essay “The Pursuit of the Past: A Potential Perspective,” in Theorizing
Historical Consciousness, ed. Peter Seixas (Toronto, 2004), 240 –55.
86
To be sure, some historians have questioned whether 9/11 deserves to be seen as
a point of rupture in the periodization of the twenty-first century. Niall Ferguson,
“2011: Ten Years from Now,” New York Times Magazine, December 2, 2001; Joseph
J. Ellis, “Finding a Place for 9/11 in American History,” New York Times, January 28,
2006, A17.
87 This was Francis Fukuyama’s assessment in the immediate wake of 9/11. “Francis
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multiculturalism altogether.88 To be sure, it is not that different groups have
entirely stopped, or will stop, pursuing their own particularistic political
agendas in the near future but rather that the attacks of September 11 and the
ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have undercut the legitimacy of identity
politics as a broader agenda within many circles. After all, if identity politics
emerged out of a process of social fragmentation and a declining sense of
national affiliation during the 1970s, the events of 9/11 may have given the
nation-state a new lease on life by promoting the cause of national unity. The
phenomenon of external threats promoting internal unity within nation-states,
of course, is an old and familiar one (as is the “social imperialist” manipulation of such threats), and so it is hardly surprising that it has manifested itself
throughout the world in those nations that recently have been targeted by
radical Islamic terrorist groups.89 The attacks of 9/11 immediately forged a
climate of national unity in the United States, and, while it proved to be
temporary, it signaled new possibilities for national affiliation. It is true that
unity can easily fray in times of crisis, but as long as the threat of terrorism
persists, it will arguably tend to reinforce centripetal forces and lessen the
appeal of pursuing particularistic political agendas.
The trend toward unity is especially reflected in the plummeting appeal of
multiculturalism throughout Europe. Radical Islamic terrorism has shattered
the vision of a multicultural society in which different ethnic and religious
groups were permitted to live (frequently with generous state support) without
integrating into mainstream society. As a result, the idea of integrating new
immigrants (mostly of Arab and Muslim background) into the larger society,
instead of allowing them to maintain their particular distinctiveness, has now
gained traction within intellectual and political circles in nations such as
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain.90 In the process, the goal

Fukuyama says Tuesday’s Attack Marks the End of ‘America’s Exceptionalism,’”
London Financial Times, September 15, 2001, 1.
88
David Brooks, “The Death of Multiculturalism,” New York Times, April 27, 2006,
A27; Amnon Rubinstein, “The End of Multiculturalism,” New York Sun, May 1, 2006,
9; John Lloyd, “The End of Multiculturalism,” New Statesman, May 27, 2002,
http://www.newstatesman.com/People/200205270012.
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Francis Fukuyama predicted that the 9/11 attacks would “make American society
stronger and more unified at home” (“Francis Fukuyama says Tuesday’s Attack Marks
the End of ‘America’s Exceptionalism’”). The same dynamic surfaced in other European nations that suffered terrorist attacks, such as England and Spain, as well as in
other nations, such as Lebanon and Jordan, that witnessed mass demonstrations of
people united against a common terrorist threat.
90 In France, in the wake of the banlieue riots in the fall of 2005, political elites are
now trying to devise new ways to integrate young Muslims into the social and
economic order. “Sarkozy Plans ‘Contracts’ for New Migrants,” London Financial
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of multicultural diversity is being challenged by the growing desire for
national unity.91
The implications for the memory boom seem clear. If the rise of identity
politics initially encouraged separate groups to probe their own histories and
formulate “countermemories” to the dominant historical narratives within
their societies, the potential decline of identity politics and the increasing
tendency to affiliate with the nation-state may well discourage such investigations in the future. This is not to suggest that the quest for particularistic
forms of memory will disappear among various groups. But it is doubtful
whether they will get as patient a hearing as they did in the multicultural
1990s. As the problems of the present mount, the lure of the past will likely
wane.

THE WANING

OF

POSTMODERNISM

At the same time that the appeal of identity politics seems to be fading, so too
is the influence of postmodernism. As it became increasingly embraced by
Western academics during the 1990s, postmodern theory lost its subversive
edge and became an established part of the Western intellectual canon. For
this reason, it is no surprise that one of the most recognizable gurus of
postmodernism, Jean Baudrillard, recently affirmed that “nobody needs
French theory” anymore, while cultural historian Michael Roth flatly declared,
“The theory wars are over. . . . The new has grown old. It’s time to write the
history of postmodernism.”92 Apart from the sense of postmodernism’s intel-

Times, February 6, 2006, 8. In Germany, politicians are reviving the old discussion
about forging a German— or, as some prefer, a European— dominant culture (Leitkultur). “Why Europe Needs a ‘Leading Culture,’ Spiegel-Online, November 26, 2004;
Charles Hawley, “Germany’s Pseudo Culture War,” Spiegel-Online, November 23,
2004. Dutch political leaders in the Netherlands have begun to question the country’s
separatistic social order of “pillars,” which has been blamed for keeping Muslim
immigrants from assimilating into the majority society. Christopher Caldwell, “Holland Daze: The Dutch Rethink Multiculturalism,” Weekly Standard, December 27,
2004; Maria Margaronis, “Dutch Tolerance Tried,” Nation, December 20, 2004. And
politicians in Great Britain have also, if controversially, called for British culture to
become more homogenous. “Race Relations Chief Savaged for Call to End Multiculturalism,” Observer, April 4, 2004; “Multicultural Britain Is Not Working Says Tory
Chief,” Daily Telegraph, August 3, 2005.
91
To be sure, while support for identity politics may be declining within large
sections of European and American society, it may actually be intensifying among
Muslims worldwide.
92 Deborah Solomon, “Continental Drift,” interview with Jean Baudrillard, New
York Times Magazine, November 20, 2005; Michael Roth’s review of Keith Jenkins’s
Refiguring History, in History and Theory, October 2004, 378. Andreas Huyssen has

150

Rosenfeld

lectual exhaustion, the main reason why various observers have felt compelled
to declare “the end of postmodernism” is the bleak new reality of the post-9/11
world.93 Today, there is less desire in many circles for relativism than certainty, and postmodernism’s association with the former has led it to be
attacked from all wings of the political spectrum for being out of step with the
new cultural mood. Predictably, conservatives charged that postmodernism’s
promotion of relativism left it unable to condemn the evil of al Qaeda’s 9/11
attacks and predicted, as the National Review did in 2002, that the movement
was consequently “on its way to the ash heap of history.”94 But centrists, such
as Edward Rothstein of the New York Times, also hoped that the attacks of
9/11 would spark a rejection of postmodernism, while critics on the left, such
as Terry Eagleton, admitted that postmodern theory had been “silent” on the
topic of evil.95 Even though defenders of postmodernism, such as Stanley
Fish, have predictably tried to defend the cause, it seems safe to say that the
public mood has turned against it.96
In truth, even without 9/11, a turn away from the relativistic mind-set
associated with postmodernism was probably overdue. Intellectual and cultural currents have come and gone with a fair degree of regularity in American
history. As Peter Novick’s book That Noble Dream has shown, the American
historical profession has fluctuated between phases of belief in the possibility
of objective historical scholarship and the certainty of historical truth, on the
one hand, and more “presentist” periods of commitment to the subjectivity
and relativity of historical knowledge, on the other. Since the United States—
and much of Western society in general— has been immersed in a four-decade
period of commitment to relativism, borne of the social movements of the
1960s and the rise of postmodernism in the 1980s, it was probably ready to
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shift back toward objectivism. The stage may thus be set for a return to the
kind of “consensus history” that took root in the American historical profession during the struggles against fascism and communism from the 1940s
through the 1960s. Such a turn would clearly suit the mood of an era
attempting to forge a unified struggle against the West’s enemies and assuredly satisfy conservatives.97 And yet, leftists have spoken out against relativism and on behalf of objectivity as well. As the British Marxist historian Eric
Hobsbawm recently put it, “It is time to re-establish the coalition of those who
believe in history as a rational inquiry into the course of human transformations, against . . . relativists and postmodernists who deny this possibility.”98
Moreover, it is not only scholars who are calling for a return to objective truth.
There seems to be a desire for it emerging within American culture more
broadly, as part of a backlash against the striking number of cases involving
plagiarism, lies, and deception in contemporary American cultural, intellectual, and political life.99
All of these trends may bode ill for the memory boom. If memory partly
rose to prominence on the coattails of postmodern relativism, it may decline
in status with the intensifying desire for objective truth. Before long, if present
trends continue, memory will once more have to take a backseat to its
traditional rival, history.

ACADEMIC LIFE CYCLES
The life span of memory’s influence as an academic specialization (and, by
extension, an “industry”) may also be nearing an end, finally, for reasons
having to do with the natural rhythms of scholarly innovation. As scholars of
historiography have shown, new areas of specialization within the field of
history have typically lasted for no more than several decades before being
eclipsed by newer methodological trends and movements. In the twentieth
97
Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American
Historical Profession (Cambridge, 1988). Novick discusses a period of belief in
objectivity from the late nineteenth century to 1914, a new era of relativism between
1918 and the outbreak of World War II, a return to objectivity from the 1940s to the
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century, the field of European history largely remained focused on political
and diplomatic history until challenged by a series of subsequent movements,
which included (among others) the “total history” of the French Annales
School, which remained influential from the 1920s through the 1950s; the
Marxist-influenced “new social history” of the 1950s and 1960s; the shortlived movement of psychohistory in the late 1960s and 1970s; and the “new
cultural history” of the 1980s and 1990s.100 To be sure, none of these earlier
methodological specialties entirely disappeared, and most continue to exist
today. All of them, however, have had to accept varying, if temporary, degrees
of marginalization as newer movements have grabbed the spotlight.
This dynamic may also apply to the study of memory. Having emerged as
an outgrowth of the new cultural history during the 1980s, the field of memory
studies has now been established for more than two decades. During this
period, the discipline has thrived. Yet if prior patterns hold, it may soon be
nearing the peak of its influence and will eventually be supplanted by a new
field of inquiry. The increasing questioning of cultural history’s elevated
status within the historical profession is one indication that memory’s influence may soon be waning.101 So too is the fact that graduate students in the
nation’s premier graduate programs in history do not seem to be writing
dissertations on memory as much as they did a decade ago.102 It is unclear at
100 Georg Iggers, New Directions in European Historiography (Hanover, NH,
1984); Gertrude Himmelfarb, The New History and the Old: Critical Essays and
Reappraisals (Cambridge, MA, 1987); Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History
(Berkeley, 1989).
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American Historical Review Forum about whether cultural history has reached the end
of its influence and ought to be replaced by a return to social history. See the April
2008 issue of the American Historical Review, 391– 437.
102
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the moment whether any new thematic or methodological focus is poised to
take memory’s place. One would suspect that, since the turn of the millennium
and 9/11, graduate students have become interested in probing the roots of the
world’s present-day crises and have turned their attention to studying the
history of the modern Middle East, Africa, China, and India (all of which are
fields where faculty positions have begun to increase) as well as such topics
as environmental history and globalization.103 Of course, it is possible, as
Geoff Eley has recently argued, that no single interpretive paradigm will
emerge and that a “new pluralism” will reign in the humanities and social
sciences.104 Yet, in view of prior patterns of historiographical turnover, it
seems likely that the study of memory will eventually be eclipsed by some
new specialization that reflects the changing circumstances of the contemporary world.

THE FADING

OF

MEMORY: FOR BETTER

OR

WORSE?

In light of the multiplying signs that the interest in memory may soon be
fading, it is worth asking whether this development should be welcomed or
bemoaned. Not surprisingly, opinions have differed sharply on this question.
A good number of scholars have taken a bearish stance on the memory
industry, citing a variety of reasons why they relish its impending demise.
Some have complained about its allegedly adverse impact upon the practice of
history. Kerwin Klein, for example, has expressed the concern that the
memory industry’s embrace of unrigorous, “sacralizing” concepts borrowed
from “New Age” thought—such as “trauma,” “mourning,” “redemption,”
“healing,” and “testimony”— has undermined the field of history as a “secular,
critical practice.”105 Other scholars, meanwhile, have complained about what
they see as the worrisome political tendencies of the memory boom. John
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time together with the fact that the forty-eight mentioned above were conceived in the
ten years between 1991 and 2001, the falloff in production does not seem as dramatic.
It suggests, indeed, that there will not be any crash of the memory industry but rather
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Torpey and Charles Maier have charged that the new prominence of memory
reflects a neoconservative trend of political quietism that reflects “our current
incapacity to entertain transformative political projects for the future.”106 Still
other scholars have questioned both the memory boom and the memory
industry by attacking one of the trends that directly contributed to their
emergence—the rise of Holocaust memory. For David Stannard, Peter Novick, and others, the increased attention toward the Holocaust—what the
notorious polemicist Norman Finkelstein sarcastically, but tellingly, termed
the “Holocaust industry”— has had the adverse effect of overshadowing, if not
denying, the existence of other groups’ historic sufferings.107 Whatever their
specific objections to the topic of memory, these critics have implicitly
recommended a healthy dose of forgetting. After predicting the imminent end
of Europe’s obsession with remembrance, for example, Tony Judt has concluded that “some measure of . . . forgetting [is a] . . . necessary condition of
civic health.108 And Charles Maier, believing there to be a “surfeit of memory,” has expressed the hope “that the future of memory is not too bright.”109
Especially as other scholars, such as Harald Weinrich, David Gross, and Marc
Augé, have begun to historicize the phenomenon of forgetting and recognize
its virtues, it appears that memory will no longer be automatically hailed as an
unalloyed good.110
At the same time, however, many scholars have remained bullish on
memory and have energetically defended it. Some have rejected the idea that
memory has had an adverse effect on history, pointing out, as Wulf Kansteiner
has done, that in the wake of postmodernism, most scholars have been forced
to recognize that neither memory nor history has a claim to absolute objectivity.111 Others have rejected the charge of memory’s political conservatism,
insisting that it has promoted a largely progressive political agenda throughout
the world. Evidence for this claim has been marshaled by scholars like Elazar
Barkan, Daniel Levy, and Natan Sznaider, who have specifically credited the
106
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111 Kansteiner quotes Peter Burke’s remark from 1989 that “neither memories nor
histories seem objective any longer” (Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory,”
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growth of Holocaust memory with the emergence of a “global morality” and
a “global memory culture” that has inspired other persecuted groups to pursue
redress for historical injustices and helped to advance human rights worldwide.112 In a slightly different vein, Aleida Assmann has recently pointed to
the transnational effort in Europe to create a “common historical memory for
the growing European Union” as a promising method of strengthening European integration and transforming the European Union into a “community of
memory.”113 For these and other scholars, the emergence of calls to appreciate
the virtues of forgetting are ill-advised. From their perspective, the intensifying talk of “memory fatigue” simply underscores the need to reaffirm memory’s merits. As Eric Langenbacher and Friederike Eigler have concluded,
“Memory still matters.”114
It is impossible to resolve this ongoing discussion in the limited space of
this article. But it is worth noting that both the critics and the defenders of
memory can easily be charged with tendentious argumentation. The fact that
some of the scholars who have predicted memory’s impending decline are the
same ones who have criticized its alleged shortcomings leads one to suspect
that their predictions may partly be exercises in wish fulfillment. The same
can be said of those who continue to defend memory’s enduring relevance
while ignoring the massive changes that have swept the world since the boom
first began. Both sides of the debate, of course, have a major stake in its
outcome. Indeed, in arguing about the future of the memory boom, both sides
are positioning themselves to determine the future of the academic memory
industry. Just as critics of the boom hope that attacking it will weaken the
industry and open up the contemporary scholarly terrain to new topics of
inquiry, their opponents hope that defending it will enable them to protect the
scholarly redoubts that they have labored so long to create. This being the
case, it is hard to trust either camp’s conclusions. This fact, in addition to the
possibility that the debate may only be in its beginning stages, makes it
difficult to determine whether the eventual end of the memory boom should
be viewed with anticipation or unease.
For the time being, the safest conclusion is that neither reaction is warranted. It would be just as misguided to cheer the memory boom’s demise as
to be overly fearful of it. Memory may have been unfairly criticized, but it
should not be seen as an unadulterated good in and of itself. There is plenty
112
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of historical evidence, after all, that memory and forgetting have each served
indispensable functions within societies the world over. Part of their value
derives from their ability to serve as counterweights to one another. Just as
memory serves an important ethical function during periods of forgetfulness,
forgetting permits life to move forward in eras that cannot escape memory’s
grip. Both, moreover, are necessary for true historical understanding. As Otto
Friedrich has persuasively argued, even if “[George] Santayana was probably
right . . . [in arguing that] those who cannot remember history are condemned
to repeat it . . . [it] is probably just as true that those who cannot forget the past
are condemned to misunderstand it.”115 Of course, it remains tremendously
difficult to assess objectively whether too much or too little memory exists in
a given society at a given time. One person’s shortage is another’s surfeit. For
this reason, memory’s future may continue to spark disagreement for some
time to come.

CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, I am reluctant to make any definitive claims about the
ultimate fate of either the memory boom or the memory industry. I hesitate to
do so partly because I share most historians’ discomfort with making predictive claims but also because I am aware of the difficulties inherent in trend
spotting as a mode of analysis. Even though we may belong to the “trend
spotting generation” and have become adept at recognizing how diverse
factors slowly converge until they reach a “tipping point” and become new
trends, it is my sense that we remain less clear about why existing trends fade
and ultimately disappear.116 I have tried to suggest that the cultural and
intellectual factors that originally fostered the memory boom have begun to
wane since the turn of the millennium, but whether they have yet collectively
reached what we might call the tipping point in reverse remains unclear. That
point is surely in the offing, however, and the memory boom’s status will
inevitably be downgraded once it is reached.
The same is true of the memory industry. The production of academic
studies on the subject of memory, as noted above, will partly be affected by
memory’s changing status in the world at large. But, appropriately enough,
economic forces may shape the industry’s future as well. In recent years, the
field of memory studies has expanded so rapidly that it could face something
like a crisis of overproduction. With the field currently spanning everything
115 Otto Friedrich, Before the Deluge: A Portrait of Berlin in the 1920s (New York,
1995), xxi.
116 Daniel Radosh, “The Trendspotting Generation” (originally published in GQ,
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from international relations to cookbooks, there exists the possibility that the
supply of scholarship will outpace demand and eventually result in a memory
glut (or, to use the contemporary term of choice, a memory “bubble”).117 This
outcome is especially possible if the competition between scholars to discover
uncharted analytical terrain increasingly drives them to narrowly specialized
topics that appeal only to small audiences. At this juncture, as the industry’s
excess capacity becomes apparent, many of the scholars who once jumped
onto the memory bandwagon may decide to leap to other topics, and the field
of memory studies will no longer be able to sustain its previous rate of
expansion.
This is not to say that the memory industry will experience anything like a
crash. Indeed, it is far more likely to experience a soft landing. Even if certain
scholars leave the field of memory studies, others will continue to do productive work as the discipline matures. Moreover, just as there is a considerable
time lag between the emergence of scholarly trends and their manifestation in
the world of academic publishing, it is equally true that their waning will take
time to register as well. Even once the memory boom is over, in other words,
the scholarly memory industry may survive for some time thereafter. By then,
of course, the field will have been downgraded from a formidable industry to
an ordinary subdiscipline within academia at large.
Some may be tempted to view this demotion with anxiety, as a popping of
the memory “bubble.” But they need not be overly concerned. For as Daniel
Gross’s recent work of economic history, Pop! Why Bubbles Are Great for the
Economy, has shown, the collapse of most economic bubbles in the United
States during the past two centuries has had a silver lining by leaving behind
valuable infrastructure and cultural know-how that has provided the basis for
further growth and development.118 A similar fate may lie in store for the
memory boom and the memory industry. Both have created a massive infrastructural apparatus—in the form of innumerable museums, memorials, documentation centers, and academic journals—that will keep memory institutionally anchored even after it departs from the spotlight. Even if they no
longer make international headlines, historical exhibits will continue to be
organized and monographs will be written and conferences convened—and all
of them will contribute to our evolving historical knowledge. The same can be
said about the habits of mind that have been created by the memory boom and
the memory industry. The many debates that have erupted over divisive
historical legacies since the late 1980s have conditioned us to think about the
117 Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament: Memory and
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in Postwar Europe; Cara De Silva, In Memory’s Kitchen: A Legacy from the Women
of Terezin (New York, 1996).
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relationship between history and memory in new and more sophisticated
ways. Today, it is easier for us to identify the telltale signs of unmastered pasts
and to recognize genuine efforts to atone for historical injustices. As a result,
whenever controversies over the past erupt in the future—and they are sure to
surface wherever unmastered pasts remain—our recent experience of the
memory boom will, one hopes, make us better able to understand and resolve
them.
These realities should hearten those who fear for the future of remembrance
at the end of the memory boom. There will probably not be another worldwide
wave of interest in memory like the one we have just witnessed anytime soon.
The volatile course of contemporary events will probably ensure that public
attention remains focused more on the present than the past. But even as the
boom ebbs, its legacy will remain with us in countless ways. Indeed, to the
extent that today’s world crises have their roots in unmastered pasts, our
newfound ability to probe their origins may help us master the challenges of
the present.

